Probabilistic public key encryption with equality test (PKEET), introduced by Yang et al. in CT-RSA 2010, is able to check whether two ciphertexts are encryptions of the same message under different public keys without leaking anything else about the message encrypted under either public key. PKEET schemes have many applications, for example, in constructing searchable encryption and partitioning encrypted data. Previous PKEET schemes lack a delegation mechanism for users to specify who can perform the equality test between their ciphertexts. In this paper, we propose the notion of public key encryption with delegated equality test (PKE-DET), which requires only the delegated party to deal with the work in a practical multi-user setting, and present a concrete construction in Type 2 pairing, which is provably secure under the newly introduced security notions.
INTRODUCTION
The Database-as-a-Service (DaaS) model [1] is a new computing paradigm in cloud computing. Since highly sensitive data are now stored in locations without the data owner's control, such as leased space and partners' sites, it puts data confidentiality at risk. Therefore, such a varying trust scenario necessitates encryption techniques in the context of outsourced database [2] [3] [4] . In the database application equal join as a basic operator is used to concatenate each tuple of the first table with each tuple of the second table and output only those pairs of tuples with the same value on those joined attributes. We observe that such an operator in the DaaS model necessitates a public key encryption (PKE) to support equality test on ciphertexts without decryption. Those ciphertexts may be generated for a single user [5, 6] , or more generally, for multiple users [7] . Motivated by this intuition, we propose a PKE with delegated equality test (PKE-DET) under multiple public keys, which can be described as follows: given any two ciphertexts c A and c B generated under Alice's public key pk A and Bob's public key pk B , respectively, the third party with key pair (pk S , sk S ) who is delegated to perform the equality test on their ciphertexts can use two trapdoors t A and t B from Alice and Bob to evaluate the function Test(c A , t A , c B , t B , sk S ), which returns 1 if and only if c A and c B are encryptions of the same message regardless of pk A = pk B or not. PKE-DET and PRE. Blaze et al. [8] formulated the concept of proxy re-encryption (PRE) cryptosystem and proposed the first bidirectional PRE scheme. Subsequently, different PRE schemes with various properties [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] were proposed. In a PRE scheme, a proxy is given special information that allows it to translate a ciphertext under one key into a ciphertext of the same message under a different key. The proxy cannot, however, learn anything about the message encrypted under either key. PRE schemes have many practical applications, including distributed storage, email and digital rights management (DRM) [10] .
Both PKE-DET and PRE are concerned with ciphertexts of the same plaintexts under different public keys but their functionalities are different. Without decryption PKE-DET is used to check whether two ciphertexts are the encryptions of the same plaintext. PRE can be used to transform a ciphertext to another ciphertext with the same message. PKE-DET and PEKS. PKE with keywords search (PEKS) was first proposed by Boneh et al. [14] and studies searching keywords on encrypted data. A sender makes a ciphertext of a keyword w by using the receiver's public key and sends it to the server. A receiver makes a trapdoor t w for a keyword w and uploads it to the server, which tests if w = w . Several PEKS schemes with additional functionalities [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] have been proposed thus far.
Both PEKS and PKE-DET can be regarded as a category of PKE supporting search on ciphertexts. But the differences between PEKS and PKE-DET include the following:
(1) PEKS ciphertexts are generated under the same public key and the only trapdoor is generated under the corresponding private key. However, PKE-DET ciphertexts are generated under different public keys and the unencrypted trapdoor for each receiver is generated under its private key. (2) PKE-DET supports keywords search trivially provided by PEKS. The trapdoor consists of both a ciphertext c of keyword w and the associated trapdoor t R in PKE-DET. Then, given a ciphertext c of keyword w , the server with secret key sk S tests whether Test(c, t R , c , t R , sk S ) is equal to 1. (3) The server has the controllability with different granularity over the delegated search capability for PEKS and PKE-DET. PEKS is used to check if the ciphertext contains a particular keyword; it can be viewed as an implementation of fine-grained control. However, PKE-DET is used to search the ciphertext of a user for any keyword as long as it is given its trapdoor. It is viewed as an implementation of coarse-grained control.
PKE-DET and PKEET. PKE with equality test (PKEET) [7] was firstly proposed to check whether two ciphertexts encrypted under different public keys contain the same message. However, their formulation lacks an authorization mechanism to specify who can perform equality test between their ciphertexts. In fact, any entity can perform the test in PKEET. Later, to mitigate the potential vulnerabilities, Tang [23] integrated a fine-grained authorization policy enforcement mechanism into PKEET and proposed an enhanced primitive, namely FG-PKEET. Also, Tang [24] proposed an all-or-nothing PKEET (AoN-PKEET), which introduces a coarse-grained authorization mechanism to specify who can perform a plaintext equality test from their ciphertexts. Tang [25] extended FG-PKEET to a two-proxy setting, where two proxies need to collaborate in order to perform the equality test. PKE-DET can also be viewed as an extension of PKEET. It is similar to the AoN-PKEET except for security enhancement. Our PKEET variant has a modest authorization mechanism in many database applications. For example, in a hospital scenario (Fig. 1) suppose that a hospital has many branches distributed in different regions. Each branch has its public/secret key pair released by the hospital. The table for each branch (e.g. P atA and P atB tables for branch A and B, respectively) contains the patient ID, age and encrypted disease name, denoted by P atI d, Age and Enc(DisName), respectively. To find the average age of patients in the department of pediatrics in the P atA table with the same disease in the department of pediatrics in the P atB and pk B , respectively, the database server can execute the operation after receiving the trapdoors from the branch A and the branch B. Our contribution. We propose the notion of PKE-DET, which owns the following properties:
(1) Unlike PEKS in which only the metadata part of the ciphertext is searchable, the encrypted data are both searchable and decryptable in our scheme. (2) If the server is not delegated the equality test on ciphertexts, it cannot deduce any meaningful information from the encrypted data. (3) Once the data owner delegates the equality test on ciphertexts to the sever, it can go offline. Namely, after the server obtains the trapdoors from the data owner, without decryption it can test by itself whether their ciphertexts contain the same message.
We propose a scheme implemented in the Type 2 pairing [26] and prove its security against three types of adversaries in the random oracle model. This scheme is shown to satisfy:
( Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give some preliminaries. In Section 3, we formally define PKE-DET and give its security definitions. Next, we provide a construction of PKE-DET in Section 4 and its security proofs in Section 5. In Section 6, we compare it with other schemes. Section 7 concludes.
PRELIMINARIES
Bilinear map: Let G 1 , G 2 and G T be three multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. Suppose that g 1 and g 2 are generators of G 1 and G 2 , respectively. A bilinear map e : G 1 × G 2 → G T satisfies the following properties:
There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(g 1 , g 2 ) for any g 1 ∈ G 1 and g 2 ∈ G 2 .
If G 1 = G 2 , then the pairing is asymmetric. In the asymmetric setting, if there is an efficiently computable isomorphism ψ : G 2 → G 1 , then e is called a Type 2 pairing [26, 27] . Using asymmetric pairing is crucial for the security of our scheme. With symmetric pairing (G 1 = G 2 ), the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is not intractable in G 1 (or G 2 ). However, we use the DDH assumption in G 1 in the security proof.
External Diffie-Hellman (XDH) assumption on
The XDH assumption implies the existence of two groups G 1 , G 2 (G 1 = G 2 ) with the following properties:
(1) the discrete logarithm problem, the computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH) and the computational co-Diffie-Hellman problem (co-DH) are all intractable in G 1 and G 2 ; (2) there exists an efficiently computable bilinear map e :
where the CDH problem, the DDH problem and the co-DH problem are defined as follows. CDH problem on G 1 : We say that the CDH problem is -hard in 
We say that the CDH assumption holds if for any polynomialtime algorithm A, its advantage Adv 
We say that the co-DH assumption holds if, for any polynomialtime algorithm A, its advantage Adv 
We say that the BDH assumption holds if, for any polynomialtime algorithm A, its advantage Adv
is negligible.
DEFINITIONS
In the PKE-DET scheme, there are three roles: the data owner, the delegated party and the cloud server. The data owner wants to store some sensitive data in the cloud server. Initially, it generates its public/private key under public parameters. Then it encrypts these sensitive data using its public key to protect the data privacy. Some day, if it wants to delegate equality test on its ciphertexts, it can use its private key and the server's public key to generate a trapdoor. It can keep this trapdoor or give it to the delegated party, who also needs to retrieve encrypted data on the cloud server. After the server receives a query from the data owner or the delegated party, it then uses the trapdoors to search ciphertexts. Finally, the delegated party obtains the returned matched ciphertexts. Figure 2 illustrates the overview of the PKE-DET scheme. Formally, we give the following definitions. As to the ciphertext security of the PKE-DET scheme, we consider four types of adversaries whose main goal is to reveal information about the encrypted data.
(1) Type-I adversary represents a curious server, who owns both the server's private key and the trapdoor. With respect to such an adversary, we define the notion of OW-CCA security. (3) Type-III adversary represents an outsider attacker, who obtains the trapdoor but does not own the server's private key. With respect to such an adversary, we also define the notion of IND-CCA security. (4) Type-IV adversary represents an outsider attacker, who does not own the server's private key or the trapdoor. In fact, if our scheme can achieve IND-CCA security against a Type-II adversary and Type-III adversary, it is obvious that it also can achieve IND-CCA security against a Type-IV adversary since a Type-IV adversary gains less information than the Type-II adversary and the Type-III adversary during the attack game. Hence, we omit the security definition against a Type-IV adversary.
As to the trapdoor security of the PKE-DET scheme, since each receiver has only one unencrypted trapdoor, which is only related to the receiver's private key without being related to any message, we define the notion of anonymous trapdoor.
In the following, we present the definitions with respect to these four privacy concerns.
where Offline message recovery attack. Similarly to the offline keyword guessing attack in PEKS, the offline message recovery attack [25] exists in PKEET. This type of attack is unavoidable due to the desired functionality. For example, given a ciphertext c A = Encrypt(m, pk A ) and a trapdoor t A = Delegate(sk A , pk S ), the server can test whether m = m holds for any m ∈ M by checking the following equation:
Therefore, when the message space is polynomial size, the adversary delegated equality test on the ciphertexts is capable of mounting an offline message recovery attack by checking every m ∈ M.
THE PROPOSED SCHEME
(1) Setup(λ): On input of the security parameter λ the algorithm outputs public parameters pp as follows.
(a) Generate Type 2 pairing parameters: group
k+log p , where k is a security parameter such that the elements of G 2 are represented in k bits.
(2) KeyGen S (pp): On input the public parameters pp the algorithm selects θ ∈ R Z p and outputs the server's key pair:
On input the public parameters pp, the algorithm selects α, β ∈ R Z p and outputs the receivers's key pair:
2 ) ⊕ m||r 1 . 
and outputs m if the following equations hold:
If either equation does not hold, the algorithm outputs an error symbol ⊥. (6) Delegate(sk R , pk S ): It selects r 3 ∈ R Z p and generates a trapdoor to support the equality test on the encrypted data:
Suppose that the server obtains the receiver R's trapdoor 4 , c 2 ) ) . 
And then we can compute ( (v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , v 4 ) , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) , it returns the plaintext m by running the Decrypt algorithm using the secret key (α, β). Meanwhile, A may not request the decryption of c * itself. O T oracle query: On input a public key pk S , it returns the trapdoor t by running the Delegate algorithm using the secret key α.
We define S 0 to be the event that m = m in Game 0. It should be evident that this algorithm faithfully represents the attack game, so
Next we modify Game 0 and obtain the following game. Game 1: 
If the check fails, ⊥ is returned; otherwise, m is returned. O T oracle query: It is simulated in the same way as that in Game 0.
Let S 1 be the event that m = m in Game 1. Owing to the idealness of the random oracle, Game 1 is identical to Game 0. We claim that
In the next game, we further modify the simulation in an indistinguishable way. Game 2: Let S 2 be the event that m = m in Game 2. The challenge ciphertext generated in this game is identically distributed to that in Game 1, as c * 4 is a random value in both Games 1 and 2. Therefore, if E 1 does not occur, Game 2 is identical to Game 1. We claim that
Next, we show that the event E 1 occurs with negligible probability: 
Therefore, if event D 2 does not happen, then the simulation is identical to Game 2, and we claim that
Owing to Equations (5)- (7), we have 
So if Pr[S 2
] is non-negligible, then the probability of breaking the co-DH assumption is non-negligible. This completes the proof of Lemma 5.2.
Therefore, due to Equations (1)- (4) and (9) 4 . The security proof is done through a sequence of games. Game 0: We define Game 0 to be the attack game against A in Definition 3.4.
. H 1 oracle query: On input v ∈ G T , a random value h 1 ∈ G 2 is returned, and meanwhile if the same input is asked multiple times, the same answer will be returned. We define F 0 be the event that b = b in Game 0. It should be evident that this algorithm faithfully represents the attack game, so
Next we modify Game 0 and obtain the following game. Game 1:
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, c * 4 ) defined as follows:
And add the tuple (c *
In the next game, we further modify the simulation in an indistinguishable way. Game 2:
And add the tuple (c * Let F 2 be the event that b = b in Game 2. The challenge ciphertext generated in this game is identically distributed to that in Game 1, as c * 4 is a random value in both Games 1 and 2. Therefore, if E 1 does not occur, Game 2 is identical to Game 1. We claim that
Similar to the proof of Lemma 5.1, we can prove the following claim:
Pr
In the next game, we further modify the simulation in an indistinguishable way.
And add the tuple (c * 2 ) α to get the answer h 1 ∈ G 2 ; (d) perform the validity check:
If the check fails, ⊥ is returned; otherwise, m is returned.
The H 1 oracle is identical to Game 2 due to the idealness of the random oracle. Next, we show that the O D oracle is indistinguishable from Game 2. We separate all the decryption queries into two types:
(1) e(g 1 , c 2 ) α has been queries to H 1 oracle before a decryption query (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) . In this case, h 1 is uniquely determined after e(g 1 , c 2 ) α is queried to H 1 oracle. So the decryption oracle is the same with Game 2. (2) e(g 1 , c 2 ) α has never been queries to H 1 oracle before a decryption query (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) . In this case, ⊥ is returned by the decryption oracle. If (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) is a valid ciphertext, the decryption oracle fails. Owing to the idealness of the random oracle, this happens with probability 1/2 k . Let this event be D 3 . 
Owing to Equations (15) and (16), we have
In the next game, we further modify the simulation in an indistinguishable way. Game 4: The challenge ciphertext generated in this game is identically distributed to that in Game 3, as c * 3 is a random value in both Games 3 and 4. Therefore, if E 2 does not occur, Game 4 is identical to Game 3. We claim that
Next, we first show that event E 2 occurs with negligible probability: 
and generates the challenge ciphertext c
, which is defined as follows:
It then adds (c * (g 1 , c 2 ) α has never been queried to H 1 oracle before a decryption query (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) is issued. In this case, ⊥ is returned by the decryption oracle. The simulation fails if (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) is a valid ciphertext. However, due to the idealness of the random oracle, this happens with probability 1/2 k .
Denote by D 4 the event that a valid ciphertext is rejected in the simulation; then we have 
Therefore,
So if Pr[E 2 ] is non-negligible, the probability of breaking the BDH assumption is non-negligible. This completes the proof of Lemma 5.3. Owing to Equations (11) , (12)- (14), (17)- (19) and (23), we claim that
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.2. Since the Pairing operation is much more expensive than the Exponent operation, we can claim that PKE-DET achieves a significant security improvement against offline message recovery attack.
COMPARISON
In Table 1 , we compare PKE-DET proposed in Section 4 with PKEET [7] , PKEET-UA [24] and PKE-DKS [22] . The second, third, fourth and fifth rows show the computation comparison for the data owner in algorithms KeyGen R , Encrypt, Decrypt and Delegate. The sixth and seventh rows indicate the computation comparison for the server in algorithms KeyGen S and Test. The eighth row lists the size of the ciphertext. The ninth and tenth rows show whether the schemes support keywords search or the equality test. The last five rows indicate that the comparison for the security, which includes the ciphertext security with or without the delegated equality test, whether achieving anonymous trapdoor security and whether resisting an offline attack with or without the delegated equality test (if not, the computation complexity of the adversary is shown).
In terms of the computation complexity, the major computational cost is due to the evaluation of bilinear pairings and scalar multiplications on elliptic curves, which are known to be costly and dominate the computational complexity. We choose to compare our PKE-DET scheme with that in [7, 22, 24] in terms of dominating computational operations. By means of an exponent array, simultaneous scalar multiplication of the form g s Y r is as expensive in computation as only 1.167 scalar multiplications [29] . According to the existing experimental results on ECC [30] and Pairing [31, 32] , a bilinear pairing costs about five times than the elliptic curve scalar multiplication on a conventional desktop computer. Interested readers can refer to [30] [31] [32] [33] for detailed information. The computational complexity of our protocol can be further improved by precomputing e(g 1 , u 1 ) and including it in the public parameters. So the algorithm Encrypt will need one less pairing evaluation. In terms of storage overheads, because PKEET [7] , PKE-DKS [22] and PKE-DET are constructed on the elliptic curves for pairing, their ciphertexts are much shorter than that in PKEET-UA [24] , which is constructed on the discrete logarithm group.
Compared with the first PKEET [7] , PKE-DET has security improvement to prevent ciphertext comparison without the delegation. We make use of the first PKEET [7] and the wellknown IBE [34] PKEET [7] PKEET-UA [24] PKE more computation overheads. The goal of PKE-DET is similar to that of PKEET-UA [24] . The difference is that PKE-DET can achieve anonymous trapdoor security and has more advantage on resisting offline message recovery attack. However, another problem arises that the computation overheads of the legal test on ciphertexts also increases. Since the legal test is run by the cloud server, which has more powerful computing capability, PKE-DET is suitable and applicable for the scenario with higher security requirement. Compared with PKE-DKS [22] , PKE-DET supports more functionality than PKE-DKS and has higher ciphertext security.
In conclusion, we do not need to sacrifice much efficiency in algorithms of KeyGen S , KeyGen R and Encrypt than that in [7, 22, 24] . Owing to the powerful computation capability of the cloud server, the loss in computation efficiency in the Test algorithm is tolerable as we now have security improvement.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a PKE-DET in a multi-user setting and prove in a random oracle model that our scheme achieves: (1) OW-CCA secure against a Type-I adversary under the CDH and co-DH assumptions; (2) IND-CCA secure against a Type-II adversary under the CDH and BDH assumptions; (3) IND-CCA secure against a Type-III adversary under the CDH, BDH and DDH assumptions; (4) Anon-TD secure under the DDH assumption. We also compare it with other schemes [7, 22, 24] with regard to the computation overheads of receiver and server, the storage overheads, the supported functionality and the security.
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